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WASHINGTON, DC- Speaking on the Senate floor today U.S. Senator Bob Casey (D-PA) urged President Bush to work with Congress on any future long-term security agreements with Iraq.   

“Unfortunately, the Administration is handling these negotiations in the same manner that has characterized its entire approach to Iraq since 2003:  with unnecessary secrecy, a disdain for Congressional input and an arrogant insistence that its course of action is the only reasonable option,” said Casey.  

In March, Senator Casey was joined by Senator Jim Webb (D-VA) in sending a letter to the Senate Appropriations Committee urging them to prohibit the use of funds in the FY08 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations bill to carry out any bilateral agreement providing U.S. security pledges or commitments to Iraq without prior Congressional approval.  The language was included in the bill that was passed out of the Committee, but was ultimately taken out.  

Last December, Senator Casey spearheaded a letter signed by Senators Robert Byrd (D-WV), Ted Kennedy (D-MA), Carl Levin (D-MI), Hillary Clinton (D-NY) and Jim Webb (D-VA) to President Bush warning him against rushing the United States into long-term security commitments to Iraq without the full participation and consent of Congress.  The letter was in response to a preliminary agreement reached in early December between the U.S. and Iraqi governments on long-term bilateral cooperation on political, security and economic matters, with a final agreement to be concluded by this summer. 

Senator Casey went on to say, “for the President of the United States to dismiss these concerns, expressed by some of the leading foreign policy and national security voices in the Congress, as mere “noise,” represents a fundamental misreading of our constitutional system of government.” 

Below is the full text of Senator Casey’s remarks as delivered:

Mr. President, I rise today to discuss two agreements under negotiation between the United States and Iraq that have grabbed headlines in recent days as more and more Iraqi politicians announce their strong opposition.  These two agreements will shape the presence of American military forces in Iraq long beyond the tenure of the current Administration.  Unfortunately, the Administration is handling these negotiations in the same manner that has characterized its entire approach to Iraq since 2003:  with unnecessary secrecy, a disdain for Congressional input, and an arrogant insistence that its course of action is the only reasonable option.  

The first agreement to which I am referring is a proposed Status of Forces Agreement, known by its acronym SOFA, which would define the authorities, privileges and immunities of American troops on Iraqi soil and allow U.S. forces to remain in Iraq beyond December 31st, when a United Nations Security Council mandate authorizing the presence of coalition troops is scheduled to expire.  Administration officials insist that another extension of the UN mandate, which has been repeatedly renewed on an annual basis, is no longer possible; the Iraqis seek to return to a normal status in the international system and no longer want to be the subject of a UN-authorized military operation.

The second agreement involves a more ambiguous Strategic Framework, which would lay out the broad political, security, and economic ties between our two nations.  While the Administration has backed away from previous statements indicating that the United States was prepared to offer a binding security guarantee to Iraq’s government to come to its defense in the event of foreign aggression or internal turmoil, it is still prepared to agree to “consult” with the Iraqi government under such circumstances.  While a promise to consult in the event of aggression has been extended by the United States to many nations around the world, and is known in diplomatic jargon as a security arrangement, it still raises concerns when the United States maintains a large scale troop presence in a nation.  Any promise to consult with a foreign government takes on much greater weight when more than 100,000 U.S. troops are stationed there. 


The United States Congress, and the American public, first learned of these two proposed agreements when President Bush and Prime Minister Maliki signed a “Declaration of Principles” last November outlining their shared intention to conclude negotiations by July 31st.  A week later, joined by five other U.S. Senators, I sent a letter to President Bush expressing deep concern over the proposed security guarantees to the Iraqi government and the insistence of the Administration that it could conclude both of these agreements without Congressional input or approval.  Since then, many Members of Congress, on both sides of the aisle, I might add, have expressed deep unease with the Administration’s approach.  Some of the questions we have raised, including at a Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing in April, include:

·        Why the sudden insistence on termination of the United Nations Security Council mandate for U.S. and other coalition troops in Iraq at the end of this year?  Why not simply extend the mandate for another year, and allow the next President to negotiate a bilateral accord with the Iraqis instead of a lame duck President?

·        Why would we accept a bilateral accord with the Iraqi government that incorporates greater restrictions on U.S. troops, including limitations on the authority to conduct combat operations and detain prisoners of war, than the current UN mandate offers?  I am a strong opponent of an open-ended U.S. combat presence in Iraq, but so long as American troops remain in Iraq, they should retain the discretion to conduct necessary operations to ensure their safety and security; American troops can never answer to a foreign government, especially one as dysfunctional as the Iraqi government.


·        Why has the Iraqi government committed to submitting these agreements to the approval of the Iraqi Parliament, acknowledging that a national consensus in Iraq must exist in support of their implementation, yet the Bush Administration stubbornly insists that the U.S. Congress can have no formal role in approval, even refusing to share draft text with key Members?


·        Why did the Administration first characterize the Strategic Framework agreement as a non-binding “declaration”, but has now changed its tune and has agreed, at the request of the Iraqis, to categorize it as an executive agreement that imposes binding obligations on both sides?

·        Why does the Iraqi Prime Minister, Mr. Maliki, have to travel to Tehran to assure the Iranian government that a bilateral agreement between the United States and Iraq poses no threat to Iran?  Does the Administration intend to use Iraq as a launching pad for future military strikes against Iran?  Why is Iran interfering in the internal affairs of its neighbor?

At a news conference yesterday during his overseas trip to Europe, President Bush responded to a question on the ongoing negotiations by asserting, “There’s all kind of noise in their system and our system.  I think we’ll get the agreement done.”  I won’t comment on the voices of opposition we see emerging in Iraq, but I am concerned that, once again, the President is dismissing legitimate concerns raised by the Congress and outside policy experts as mere “noise”.  There is bipartisan unease over the course of U.S.-Iraq negotiations and puzzlement over the supposed urgency of concluding these accords instead of merely extending the United Nations mandate.  For the President of the United States to dismiss these concerns, expressed by some of the leading foreign policy and national security voices in the Congress, as mere “noise”, represents a fundamental misreading of our constitutional system of government.

As on other issues, I encourage the President to listen closely to his Secretary of Defense.  In a television interview yesterday, Bob Gates responded to a question over Congressional input on these agreements by acknowledging “If it emerges in a way that does make binding commitments that fit the treaty-making powers or treaty-ratification powers of the Senate, then it will have to go in that direction.”

Mr. President, there is no urgency to concluding long-term agreements that define the future of the U.S. military presence in Iraq.  There is even less reason to negotiate agreements that impose unhelpful restrictions on American military personnel and obligate the United States to an ambiguous commitment to Iraq’s future security.  I urge the President to acknowledge the important and essential role that the Congress has to play here.  If the President insists on completing these agreements during the last days of his Administration, he should fully involve the relevant Congressional Committees in the ongoing negotiations and agree to submit any final accords for Congressional approval.  

Mr. President, I yield the floor.

 

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